TAXATION OF STRIKE BENEFITS
of Kaiser v. United States' represents the first
judicial pronouncement on the taxability of strike benefits paid to a
worker by a union. In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that strike benefits paid to a Kohler worker, who was not a
union member for a portion of the time during which he received the
benefits,2 were gifts, expressly reversing the district court's view that
the payments constituted taxable compensation.3 The Treasury has
previously ruled that strike,4 lockout," and unemployment0 benefits paid
to workers by a union are taxable as income because of the compensatory
element involved in such payments. Thus, the Kaiser decision expressly
repudiates one of these rulings and at least raises questions as to the
validity of the remaining two.
The district court, upholding the Treasury rulings, brought the
strike payments within the broad language of section 61 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, which includes within gross income "income from
whatever soutn:e derived." 7 The court reasoned that the strike benefits
did not come within the statutory exclusion for gifts8 because the payments were made pursuant to a provision in the union's constitution
which required a worker to remain on strike to be eligible to receive
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I z6z F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1958), reversing T58 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Wis. 1958).
The district court decision is ably noted in 13 ARK. L. REV. 75 (1959).
'Taxpayer was an employee of the Kohler Company at Sheboygan, Wisconsin, when
the strike, which was approved by the United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America, began on April 5, 1954. He began receiving strike
benefits on May 4 th and continued to receive them throughout the rest of the taxable
year. On August 19 th, he became a member of the union, but he did not pay any
initiation fee or dues because he was on strike.
158 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Wis. 1958).
O.D. 522, z CUM. BULL. 73 (1920), made strike benefits paid by a union to its
members includible in gross income. Rev. Rul. x, 1957-1 CUM. BULL. i5 has restated
this ruling to include benefits given to nonmembers.
'Rev. Rul. 58-139, 1958 INT. REV. BULL. No. x4, at 7.
6 I.T. 1293, I-1 CUM. BULL. 63 (1922).
'The

source of this section was INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § zz(a), which defined

gross income as in'luding "gains, profits, and income derived from . . . compensation
for personal service, of whatever kind and in whatever form paid . . . or gains or profits
and income derived from any source vhatever." The restatement of this definition in
§ 6 (a) of the 1954 Code has left its meaning substantially unchanged.
8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § io.(a), provides that "gross income does not include
the value of property acquired by gift. . ...
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payments'9 and because no payments were actually made to workers
who were not on strike. The court of appeals, however, emphasized
that need was the primary qualification for receipt of strike benefits, that
the amount of the benefit was determined solely by reference to personal
need rather than former earnings,' ° and that the union had neither alegal nor a moral obligation to make the payments."
The decision in the instant case seems to be at odds with the presumed intent of Congress to tax all increments of economic benefit except those specifically excluded by statute.' 2 The Supreme Court, in
accordance with this purpose to tax income comprehensively, has frequently held that the statutory concept of "income" should be broadly
"Article 16, § i1, of the International Union Constitution provided as follows:
"All Local Unions shall pay to the International Union a per capita tax ... which shall
be set aside in a special fund as the International Strike Fund, to be drawn upon exclusively for the purpose of aiding Local Unions engaged in authorized strikes and in
cases of lockout, and for that purpose only, and then only upon a two-thirds vote of
the International Executive Board." 158 F. Supp. 865, 867 (E.D. Wis. x958).

"0Strikers, when making application for benefits, were required to answer a union
questionnaire concerning their personal needs, marital status, and number of dependents.
The amount of the benefits which were given to each striker was determined by reference
to this questionnaire.
"l The district court had concluded that dues paying members had a moral right,
and perhaps even an enforceable right, to benefits if they were arbitrarily denied. This
moral right was inferred from the fact that the strike was conducted with the approval
of the International Executive Board, and from the fact that art. 12, § x, of the
International Union Constitution made it "the duty of the International Executive Board
to render all financial assistance to the members on strike consistent with the resources
and responsibilities of the International Union." 158 F. Supp. 865, 867 (E.D. Wis.

1958).
" See Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 4z9-30 (955).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
took exception with this presumed intent by citing the following instances where payments have not been taxed, even though not specifically excluded by statute: (i) retirement benefits under the Federal Old Age and Survivors' Insurance System, (2) damages
for alienation of affection, (3) damages for breach of promise to marry, (4) awards
under a wrongful death statute, (5) payments to war prisoners for mistreatment by
their captors, (6) unemployment compensation benefits paid by a state, (7) public
assistance relief payments, (8) food and medical supplies and other forms of subsistence
given by the American Red Cross to disaster victims, and (9) rehabilitation payments
to tornado victims given by a large corporate employer in a disaster area. 26z F.zd
368-69. The Treasury has previously distinguished these payments by saying, "The
benefits in these cases were held not to constitute taxable income because it was believed
that Congress intended that such benefits be not subject to the tax. However, there is
no evidence that Congress intended to exclude strike benefits from income." Rev. Rul.
1, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 15, 16.
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construed.13 Similarly, the Supreme Court has construed statutory exclusions narrowly.' 4 . Even if it be conceded that strike benefit payments
are motivated in part by feelings of charity, it seems apparent that, such
payments include an attending element! of compensation, in as much.
as a. union benefits from a strike commensurately, with its ability tQ
persuade all of the workers in a plant to remain on strike. In such.
dose-case, the judicially sanctioned policy of construing exclusions narrowly would seem to control and to dictate a finding that strike benefits
are not gifts.
Even apart from considerations of statutory construction, the validity
of. the. :Kaiser decision is impaired by an objective view of economic
realities. Both the Commissioner and the taxpayer agreed that payments were distributed only to striking workers.15 It is unlikely that
the union would have made payments to nonunion strikers had it not
expected to benefit by their continued participation in the strike. And
the fact that the amounts paid were measured by need does not necessarily establish a charitable motive in making the payments. It would
be at least as logical to attribute adversion to need to a basic desire to
prevail in the strike, since a union must apportion benefits according to
need if it hopes to dissuade workers from returning to their old jobs or
finding new ones. Under this rationalization, the payments do not fit
the usual concept of a gift, which is commonly thought to be prompted
by feelings of love or charity. 6
Since the Kaiser case is the first decision dealing with the taxability
of out-of-work payments by a union, the scope of the court's holding is a
significant question. Conceivably, strike benefits might be paid to
" Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. z8 (1949), is the leading case on this point.
It was followed in Commissioner v. LoBue, 35! U.S. 243 (1956), and Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
1

Ibid.

It was stipulated by the parties that, "The International Union grants strike
benefits to non-members of the Union, who participate in the strike, if they do not have

sufficient income to purchase food or to meet an emergency situation. The Union treats
such non-members on the same basis as members of the Union, but non-members as well
as members must be strikers before they may receive assistance from the Union." 262
F.zd 367, 371 ( 7 th Cir. x958) (Duffy, C.J., dissenting).
"6Agift is "made with detached and disinterested generosity, and is basically giving
something away for nothing." Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246-47 (1956).

A gift is "the receipt of financial advantages gratuitously." Helvering v. American
Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 330 (1943). A gift must lack "the constraining force of any
moral or legal duty as well as the incentive of anticipated benefit of any kind beyond
the satisfaction which flows from the performance of a generous act." Bogardus v.
Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937).
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strikers who are not union members, union members who have not paid
dues, and union members who have paid dues. In the instant case,
the taxpayer was not a union member for approximately half of the
time that he received payments, and for the remainder of the time, he
was a union member but did not pay dues. The case could thus be interpreted to have application to strike payments to both nonunion
workers and to union members who have never paid dues. Difficulty
might be encountered, however, if the reasoning of the Kaiser case were
extended to a case involving a dues paying union member, since he would
have given consideration for the strike benefits through payment of his
union dues, which are deductible for income tax purposes. Thus, the
Kaiser decision cannot answer what is probably the most important question in the area of taxability of strike benefits.
The case may also have significance in controversies involving lockout
and unemployment benefits paid by a union, for in these situations, unlike
a strike, it is difficult to point to a direct benefit accruing to the union
as a result of the worker's inactivity. It would, therefore, be possible
to find that such payments were motivated by sympathy for needy
workers and accordingly should be treated as gifts. Such an argument
would lose much of its force, however, if the taxpayer was eligible for
lockout or unemployment benefits only if he regularly paid dues to the
union.
Under the approach asserted in the Kaiser case, each strike benefit
plan will have to be examined closely to determine whether it is actually
based on need. The same close scrutiny must, presumably, be accorded
cases involving lockout and unemployment benefits. Yet, it would seem
a simple matter for any union to make its benefit payments in such a
manner as to comply with this blueprint. Accordingly, the practical
result of the case could well be to make all strike, lockout, and unemployment benefits nontaxable. The undesirability of such a result
indicates the need for a reappraisal of the Kaiser decision.

